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ABSTRACT
Privacy-minded Internet service operators anonymize IPv6
addresses by truncating them to a fixed length, perhaps due
to long-standing use of this technique with IPv4 and a be-
lief that it’s “good enough.” We claim that simple anonym-
ization by truncation is suspect since it does not entail pri-
vacy guarantees nor does it take into account some common
address assignment practices observed today. To investigate,
with standard activity logs as input, we develop a counting
method to determine a lower bound on the number of ac-
tive IPv6 addresses that are simultaneously assigned, such
as those of clients that access World-Wide Web services. In
many instances, we find that these empirical measurements
offer no evidence that truncating IPv6 addresses to a fixed
number of bits, e.g., 48 in common practice, protects indi-
viduals’ privacy.
To remedy this problem, we propose kIP anonymiza-
tion, an aggregation method that ensures a certain level of
address privacy. Our method adaptively determines variable
truncation lengths using parameter k, the desired number
of active (rather than merely potential) addresses, e.g., 32
or 256, that can not be distinguished from each other once
anonymized. We describe our implementation and present
first results of its application to millions of real IPv6 client
addresses active over a week’s time, demonstrating both fea-
sibility at large scale and ability to automatically adapt to
each network’s address assignment practice and synthesize
a set of anonymous aggregates (prefixes), each of which
is guaranteed to cover (contain) at least k of the active ad-
dresses. Each address is anonymized by truncating it to the
length of its longest matching prefix in that set.
1. MOTIVATION & INTRODUCTION
Protecting personally identifiable information (PII)
in the form of IP addresses warrants special attention
with IPv6 due both to nascent privacy concerns and
mandates, e.g., in the European Union, and to increased
IPv6 use, worldwide. Given today’s significant IPv6 de-
ployment and dual-stack operation, the IPv6 address
may be the identifier most likely to be unique to a
client on the increasingly encrypted World-Wide Web
(WWW). While individual IPv4 addresses are increas-
ingly shared due to address exhaustion, this is neither
intended nor commonplace with IPv6 which offers unique,
globally-routed addresses end-to-end.
In this work we investigate but one Internet privacy
measure: IP address anonymization by truncation. Ad-
dress truncation means simply to delete a set of con-
tiguous low (rightmost) bits, i.e., to remove a suffix
from an input address. Typically the suffix’ bits are re-
placed with zeroes so that the anonymized output is an
address-sized value. While more complex anonymiza-
tion techniques have been implemented and are well-
studied [5,18], they anonymize addresses in a way that
prevents the result from being used for standard secu-
rity, operations, and research tasks. Specifically, they
prevent correlation with network topology, routing, ser-
vice providers, and locations. For these purposes, trun-
cation-based anonymization is ideal if, and only if, it
can be guaranteed to improve privacy.
Such anonymization is typically performed by trun-
cating input addresses to one fixed length. Consider, for
instance, a WWW analytic system employing truncat-
ion-based IP address anonymization; e.g., zeroing the
last 8 bits of a user’s IPv4 IP address and the last 80
bits of an IPv6 address [7]. Essentially, this is equiva-
lent to masking or aggregating to /24 and /48 prefixes,
respectively, perhaps combining information about as
many as 256 IPv4 addresses or 64K IPv6 /64 prefixes.
Of course, the utilization of the IPv4 and IPv6 address
spaces differ dramatically. While someone might be-
lieve that an IPv4 /24 prefix would aggregate individual
users’ addresses 1, we ask two questions. First, can pas-
sive measurements inform decisions about anonymiza-
tion? Second, is there reason to believe that any one
IPv6 prefix length would perform satisfactorily?
The key problem is how to decide at what prefix (bit)
length(s) real addresses should be cleaved into a “pub-
lic,” suitably anonymous prefix to be preserved and
reported as is and a private suffix to be discarded or
obscured. Note that prefix preservation in truncation-
based anonymization, differs from “prefix-preserving anon-
1Evaluating anonymization of IPv4 addresses by truncation
is warranted as well, but it is not the subject of this work.
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ymization” in the literature [5,18] which preserves pre-
fix lengths amongst anonymized addresses but not the
original prefix value. To tackle the problem of deter-
mining whether truncated prefixes or aggregates might
effectively provide anonymity, i.e., to make an individ-
ual appear indistinguishable amongst a set of individ-
uals (see Section 6.1.1. [3]), we count active addresses
to determine how many they actually aggregate. Then,
we use such counting as the basis for anonymization
by variable length truncation or aggregation, resulting
in different lengths to anonymize different areas of the
address space.
The key to our technique is to count a subset of si-
multaneously assigned, active IPv6 addresses given the
likelihood that a given temporary privacy address must
still be assigned in between two times at which the ad-
dress’ activity was observed from a (possibly remote)
vantage point. We rely on the ostensibly unique identi-
fier present in temporary addresses that employ State-
less Address Autoconfiguration (SLAAC) with privacy
extensions [11]. Far and away, this is the most common
address assignment mechanism for World-Wide Web
(WWW) clients. As of March 2017 by the 3-day sta-
ble definition, i.e., “3d-stable (-7d,+7d)” [13], we find
684 million (93%) ephemeral IPv6 WWW client ad-
dresses are active per day and 4.33 billion (97%) per
week. While temporary privacy addressing aims to im-
prove privacy by complicating the tracking of user ac-
tivity beyond hours or days, we manage to use logs of
sporadic activity of these short-lived addresses to cal-
culate a lower bound on the number of simultaneously-
assigned IPv6 addresses in a given prefix even during
times when those addresses’ seem inactive, e.g., from a
remote CDN vantage point.
To the best of our knowledge, prior works have not re-
ported the privacy concerns we have with IPv6 address
anonymization by truncation nor have they proposed
privacy guarantees with such methods. Our goal is to
develop IPv6 address anonymization that yields precise,
useful results for operations and research while guaran-
teeing address privacy for users. Although this is a work
in progress, we offer the following contributions: (i) an
evaluation of IPv6 address anonymization by trunca-
tion; (ii) our kIP anonymization method (inspired by
k-anonymity [15]) and early results on its performance.
2. METHODS
kIP anonymization involves three operations, namely:
address classification, address activity matrix analysis,
and anonymous aggregate (prefix) synthesis.
2.1 Address Classification
We employ address classification to identify SLAAC
privacy addresses, i.e., those having pseudorandom val-
ues in their 64-bit IID. To do so, every input address
is preprocessed by the addr6 tool which performs an
initial stateless classification [16]. For example, con-
sider the 16 IPv6 addresses in Figure 1(a); addr6 re-
ports each of them as having a randomized IID because
they do not have some other easily recognized IID type,
e.g., EUI-64, nor an easily recognized pattern, e.g., only
low-bytes being non-zero [6]. Next, we perform a state-
ful classification using our dendracron tool [4, 13]. By
“stateful,” we mean that we classify each address in:
(a) space, relative to others addresses in a set, e.g., those
within the same /64 prefix, and in (b) time, through-
out an observation timeframe, e.g., a week. This yields
two classification metrics for each address that we will
use below: (1) its Discriminating Prefix Length (DPL)
and (2) its number of Stable Days (SD) during which
we’ve observed that address to be active and through-
out which the address might have remained assigned.
The DPL is simply the position of the first (left-most)
bit at which the address differs from its nearest (ob-
served) address. The SD is the number of days across
which the address has been seen active. The smaller an
address’ DPL (and SD) value, the more likely it is to
have a randomized IID (and a temporary one at that)
by the following rationale.
Identifying Plausible Randomness: Given a set
of addresses in a /64 prefix, the following test for ran-
domness in IIDs complements those above; it is based
on the likelihood that a subset of bits at a given position
is distinct across all of the IIDs assuming the bits were
chosen randomly. For example, suppose there are 2 ad-
dresses, and consider the leading 6 bits of their IIDs.
If these 6 bits were chosen randomly [11], then, out of
the 26 = 64 possible 6-bit strings, the likelihood that
these two IIDs have different values for these 6 bits is
63/64 ≈ 0.98. More generally, given A addresses with
candidate random IIDs in a /64 prefix, and a bit string
of length N at a given position in the IIDs, then the
number of possible bit strings is S = 2N , and the prob-
ability that the bit strings in those IIDs are distinct
is:
S
S
∗ S − 1
S
∗ S − 2
S
∗ · · · ∗ S − (A− 1)
S
For classification, we start with the number of addresses
and a desired probability, i.e., 0.99, and compute the
number of bits. In particular, given A addresses with
candidate random IIDs, we compute the smallest num-
ber of bits, N , such that the probability is at least 0.99
that all N -bit strings at a given position in the IIDs are
distinct. Given this N , we examine the IIDs in the /64
to see whether the given bit strings are all distinct. If all
bit strings are distinct, then we infer that there is fur-
ther evidence that the IIDs are pseudorandom. If they
are not all distinct, then the IIDs may still be pseudo-
random, but we choose to not make the inference. Lets
consider the candidate random bit string to begin at the
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first bit of the IID. RFC4941 [11] dictates that the 7th
bit be set to zero in an otherwise randomized IID, so, if
the bit string spans that bit, we need to allow an addi-
tional DPL bit. Conveniently, this makes 64+1+N the
99%-probable maximum DPL of each address in a set
of addresses, of size A, having candidate random IIDs.
We implement this additional test for randomness us-
ing a precomputed lookup table in dendracron, for A
ranging from 2 to about 1 million. For example, for 16
addresses such as those in Figure 1(a), the 99%-likely
maximum DPL is 64 + 1 + 14 = 79; since all the actual
DPL values (in the second column of the figure) are less
than 79, we classify these addresses as having plausibly
random IIDs as a basis for assignment inferences, next.
2.2 Address Activity Matrix Analysis
Richter et al. [14] employed an IP address activity
matrix, with time on the horizontal axis and address
space on the vertical axis, to visualize daily activity over
months and to calculate IPv4 address space utilization.
At finer timescales, we use an enhanced address ma-
trix to handle the sheer size and sparsity resulting from
IPv6 assignment practices, e.g., SLAAC with privacy
extensions. Figure 1(a) is an activity matrix capturing
activity per hour for 16 active IPv6 addresses, sorted by
address value, in one /64 prefix during 24 hours. An ad-
dress is active sometime during each hour marked with
“#” and inactive other hours from the CDN’s vantage;
see legend in Figure 1(d). The address matrix has tem-
poral parameters that allow the analysis and method to
operate on other timescales: i, the time interval used
to aggregate activity and w the time window of obser-
vation. Here i = 1 and w = 24 in hour units.
Figure 1(b) is a resorted activity matrix that con-
tains the same activity information, but with the ad-
dress’ rows in order of initial activity time (earliest first)
rather than by address value. This makes clearer which
of the addresses might be active simultaneously. (Also,
when the IID is random, sorting by address value is
meaningless.) We see, for instance, that two addresses
were both active in interval (hour) 3, but we can not
conclude that they were active simultaneously, since
interval-binned summaries e.g., hourly, do not record
durations of transactions.
In Figure 1(c), we rewrite Figure 1(b)’s activity in
four ways: address’ activity in just one interval i (within
window w) is marked “X”; address’ activity in multiple,
contiguous intervals have the first interval marked “>”
and the last “<”; intervals between those at which we
infer that the given temporary privacy address is as-
signed throughout and are marked “@”.
Address Assignment Inference: The ability to
infer address assignment between moments of activity is
the key to our method. Critically, we assume that IPv6
host implementations that support privacy extensions
choose good pseudorandom values when building their
IIDs. This allows one to infer that a given host’s tem-
porary SLAAC address with randomized IID must still
be assigned between (any) two instances of observed ac-
tivity since it is ridiculously unlikely that host or any
other will choose the same pseudorandom value for the
IID on any subsequent reconfiguration of its network
interface(s).
Now that we have inferred the intervals in which each
address is assigned, we can count the simultaneously
assigned addresses. To do so, we perform special arith-
metic to “sum” the marks in each hour interval (col-
umn): (1) Each of a column’s “@” marks increment its
total by 1; this is because those addresses were assigned
at every moment during the interval and the moments
between the previous and next intervals. (2) Either (a),
each of a column’s “>” marks can increment its total by
1 because we know that the moment between this inter-
val and the next had that additional address assigned;
or (b) each of a column’s “<” marks can increment its to-
tal by 1 because we know that the moment between this
interval and the next had that additional address as-
signed. Of (a) or (b), we choose whichever column total
would be larger. (3) All of a column’s “X” marks, taken
together, increment its total by 1 only in column’s hav-
ing no “>” or “<” marks; this is because we know there
was some specific moment amidst that interval when (at
least) one of those addresses was assigned that wasn’t a
moment between the previous and next intervals. This
process is performed for each column to come to a sum,
for example, shown totaled below the matrix in Fig-
ure 1(c). These totals, single digits with whitespace
removed here: “000100011112332321122100”, are the
lower bounds on the number of simultaneously assigned
addresses in each interval (hour). Their minimum is 0
and maximum is 3, meaning we are confident at least 3
addresses were simultaneously assigned within this /64
prefix at some moment during this day.
The last step in our matrix analysis is to infer precise
moments that the /64 prefix, itself: 2001:db8::/64,
must be assigned to some hosts’ interface, given when
the addresses it covers were known assigned. We do
so by inferring address assignment at “fenceposts,” i.e.,
the moments between our “fence sections” (intervals)
in time. Because these are the moments between in-
tervals, they number 1 fewer than intervals in the win-
dow: f = w − 1 = 23. The /64 prefix is inferred to
have been assigned at the fencepost trailing each inter-
val where there is a ! (exclamation point) mark. We
now have a time series array of size f , temporarily en-
coded: “--------!!!!!!!!-!!!!--?,” that indicates
the precise moments (between intervals) when the pre-
fix must have been assigned. Translating the ! marks
to 1 (and others to 0) makes them time series values
suitable for accumulating across an entire network (or
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the entire Internet) to compute f (hourly) lower bounds
on the count of simultaneously assigned /64 prefixes.
2.3 Synthesizing Anonymous Aggregates
Our synthesis of aggregates, i.e., larger, covering pre-
fixes that coalesce individuals’ SLAAC prefixes for pri-
vacy, is inspired by Cho et al. [2, 13] who developed
“aguri” which recursively aggregates prefixes based on
activity counts until a stopping condition is met. We
augment the aguri tree with an array (size f) of time
series counters in each node and with a new stopping
condition where a statistical function of those arrays’
(hourly) values, i.e., either minimum (min) or max-
imum (max) meets or exceed k, the desired number
of active addresses that can not be distinguished once
anonymized. We use min and max to show the range
of outcomes, and choose median as a robust metric to
avoid outliers, e.g. due to flash crowds, quiescent hours
of day, or sustained outages.
Figure 2 shows a simple example for active address
in a Meeting Network, which had only 3 active /64
prefixes covering all the attendees active addresses (as
shown in Table 1), despite the meeting running for
a week and providing IPv6 connectivity, both wired
and wireless, to its 1000+ attendees. With minimum
k = 2, our method reports one anonymous aggregate,
2001:db8:370::/55, because this network has few ac-
tive /64 prefixes.
3. RESULTS
We offer two early results based on logged IPv6 ad-
dresses of active WWW clients from real networks: (1) an
evaluation of current practice for truncation-based anony-
mization and (2) a characterization of the anonymous
aggregates produced by kIP anonymization. Both these
use real WWW client addresses found in the activity
logs of a large CDN as input data. Consider Table 1
which characterizes our active WWW client address
data sets. We chose these specific networks for the va-
riety of address assignment practices they demonstrate,
rather than, e.g., their country. We first show the Meet-
ing Network used in Figure 2 in Section 2. Note the
lower bounds for simultaneously assigned /64 prefixes
and addresses and their plausibility with 1000 atten-
dees, a subset of whose wired and wireless hosts (ap-
parently) use SLAAC.
Table 1 also shows three ISP networks, one each from
Europe (EU), Japan (JP), and the United States (US).
Seen over the 7 days of observation, the three ISPs have
wildly varying numbers of active /64 prefixes (up to
∼10× different) and /48 covering prefixes (up to ∼300×
different). This strongly suggests that either (a) their
subnet and address assignment practices differ greatly
or (b) their WWW client population sizes differ greatly.
However, note that they share similar lower bounds on
number of simultaneously assigned /64 (SLAAC) pre-
fixes and addresses calculated by our method, each be-
ing in the low single-digit millions. These intermediate
results, i.e., estimated counts of each network’s IPv6-
capable WWW clients, suggests that our method can
mitigate bias in counting caused by some networks’ ad-
dress assignment practices and is a basis of ongoing
work. In networks whose IPv6 addresses’ network iden-
tifiers (in addition to IIDs) contain pseudorandom seg-
ments or have short assignment periods from very large
pools, simple counts, e.g., active prefixes per day or
week, can far exceed the number of IPv6-capable clients
that actually exist in a given network. Thus, more care-
ful counting is warranted as the basis for guaranteed
anonymity in aggregates.
In our results below, we used the full ISP data sets
in Table 1; meaning w = 168 (overall window of time)
and f = 167 (fencepost moments) in units of i = 1 hour
(intervals). Thus, min is the minimum of the 167 lower
bounds counts of simultaneously-assigned /64 prefixes,
i.e., 167 hours (one week’s time). Likewise, max and
median are of the 167 (hourly) lower bound counts.
3.1 Evaluation of /48 Aggregation
Today, a not uncommon practice for IPv6 address
anonymization is to truncate the low 80 bits of the ad-
dress, preserving only the address’ /48 (covering) prefix
as the supposed anonymous aggregate. Based simply
on counting, in Table 1, we see that the JP ISP has
the same count (2.46 million) of active /64 prefixes and
/48 prefixes. This means, by and large, the JP ISP
does not use the bits 48-63 to differentiate individual
SLAAC-prefixed subscribers. (Those bits happen to be
zeroes, but they could use any value to the same ef-
fect.) Thus, truncating the last 80 bits of the JP ISP
addresses does nothing to obscure the SLAAC-prefix os-
tensibly associated with an individual customer. This
proves 80 bit truncation, and /48 aggregation, is inef-
fective at anonymizing a customer’s SLAAC prefix in
this network.
To explore this more broadly, Figure 3 plots the dis-
tribution of prefix lengths necessary to aggregate 2 si-
multaneously assigned active /64 prefixes together. (IPv6
hosts have a 64-bit subnet prefix [1,8], thus an ISP com-
monly provides at least a /64 prefix to each customer
or subscriber.) This is based on our empirical measure-
ments and lower bounds on numbers of simultaneously-
assigned IPv6 /64 prefixes as described in Section 2. In
this figure, note the JP ISP’s (red) k = 2 min and
max prefix lengths always plot left of bit 48 on the
horizontal axis; as above, this confirms that aggrega-
tion to /48 would never aggregate any individual cus-
tomer’s SLAAC prefixes together, thus truncation to
/48 does not improve privacy to subscribers. The fig-
ure also shows (solid blue) that the EU ISP’s k = 2 min
4
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P S hour of day
IPv6 address L D 0 1 2
----------------------------- -- - 012345678901234567890123
2001: db8 ::117a:e091:b2bd:ca65 67 0 |-------+-------+--##---
2001: db8 ::21ad:6d24 :641a:1314 68 0 |--#----+-------+-------
2001: db8 ::3454: ae0d :20a0:df4d 68 0 |-------+--#----+-------
2001: db8 ::4974: fa8b :465d:4c2a 68 0 |-------+-------+#---#--
2001: db8 ::503c:a91d:be00:9a63 68 0 |-------##-###--+-------
2001: db8 ::6867:8 a64 :5417: e731 70 0 |-------+---##--+-------
2001: db8::6 d35:ee11:ec45:f658 70 0 |-------+-------+#------
2001: db8 ::7070: a7fc :47d5:02ba 70 0 |------#+-------+-------
2001: db8 ::7554: b66a:a983 :9665 70 0 |-------+--#----+-------
2001: db8 ::7939:1 bd6:fec2 :85bb 70 0 |-------+------#+-------
2001: db8::7 ccc :3977:7 c76:bdef 70 0 |-------+-------+---#---
2001: db8 ::890b:1f0d:14e2:0ccb 67 0 |-------+----#--+-------
2001: db8::a0fc:1e18:48aa:eb2e 67 0 |-------+---#---#-------
2001: db8::f930 :9833: f8c5 :3926 74 0 |-------+----#--#-------
2001: db8::f94d:fcec:6b8e:d61f 74 0 |-------#-------+-------
2001: db8::fd28 :50fe :8445:83 e7 70 0 |--#----+-------+-------
2001: db8 ::/64 16; Temporary SLAAC: 100.00%
2001: db8 ::/64 -------------------------------------------->
(a) Initial Activity Matrix: 16 addresses in 1 /64 prefix
hour of day
0 1 2
012345678901234567890123
|--#----+-------+-------
|--#----+-------+-------
|------#+-------+-------
|-------##-###--+-------
|-------#-------+-------
|-------+--#----+-------
|-------+--#----+-------
|-------+---##--+-------
|-------+---#---#-------
|-------+----#--#-------
|-------+----#--+-------
|-------+------#+-------
|-------+-------+#---#--
|-------+-------+#------
|-------+-------+--##---
|-------+-------+---#---
----------------------->
(b) Time Sorted Activity
hour of day
0 1 2
012345678901234567890123
|--X----+-------+-------
|--X----+-------+-------
|------X+-------+-------
|------->@@@@ <--+-------
|-------X-------+-------
|-------+--X----+-------
|-------+--X----+-------
|-------+---><--+-------
|-------+--->@@@ <-------
|-------+---->@@<-------
|-------+----X--+-------
|-------+------X+-------
|-------+-------+>@@@ <--
|-------+-------+X------
|-------+-------+--><---
|-------+-------+---X---
000100011112332321122100
|-------+-------+-------
--------!!!!!!!!-!!!!--?
(c) Inferred Assignment
| = every 24th interval in the matrix , e.g., first hour of day , UTC
+ = every 8th interval in the matrix , e.g., 8 hours
# = activity logged during the given hour
X = activity started and ended during the given hour , i.e., a "short" episode
> = activity started during the given hour , i.e., beginning of an episode
< = activity ended during the given hour , i.e., end of an episode
@ = infer address assigned throughout the given interval , e.g., hour
! = infer /64 prefix assigned at trailing edge of given hour , i.e., the "fencepost" moments between intervals
? = the last "fencepost" moment is discarded since address assignment can ’t be determined (yet)
(d) matrix legend
Figure 1: (a) Address classifications (DPL, SD) and activity matrix for one /64 prefix: 2001:db8::/64, here, having
16 SLAAC addresses observed as active during 24 hours time. In the matrices, space is represented vertically and
time progresses horizontally, left to right. The matrix’ addresses are then sorted (b) by their initial activity times.
Finally, we infer (c) the number of simultaneously assigned IPv6 addresses and /64 prefix(es) on-off times.
2001:db8:370::/64     !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2001:db8:370::/55 2001:db8:370:128::/64 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2001:db8:370::/54
2001:db8:370:228::/64 !------------!---------
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(a)
2001:db8:370::/55
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
2001:db8:370::/54
2001:db8:370:228::/64 !------------!---------
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(b)
2001:db8:370::/55
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
2001:db8:370::/54
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(c)
Figure 2: A 3-step method to calculate anonymous aggregates using a binary PATRICIA tree, for example, the
Meeting Network in Table 1. (a) First, a tree is populated with active /64 prefixes (the 3 nodes with solid lines),
each with a time series showing assignment, on or off. (b) Next, the tree is aggregated and the arrays added to their
parent until the min count of k = 2 is reached. Here, the first two /64s have been aggregated to their parent, but the
third has not yet been visited. (c) Finally, after aggregation is complete, we report only the anonymous aggregates
with (at least) the desired number of simultaneous addresses (2): only the one prefix shown in a solid box.
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Total Total Lower bound simultaneously Lower bound simultaneously Total
Data set 7-day date range active /48 active /64 assigned /64 prefixes assigned addresses active
prefixes prefixes maximum (median) maximum (median) addresses
Meeting Network Mar 25-31 2017 1 3 3 (2) 309 (84) 15.4K
EU ISP Sep 17-23 2016 163K 21.5M 2.02M (1.52M) 3.80M (2.63M) 125M
JP ISP Mar 17-23 2017 2.46M 2.46M 1.21M (897K) 2.26M (1.54M) 72.2M
US ISP Mar 17-23 2017 8.16K 2.42M 1.81M (1.66M) 4.71M (3.82M) 84.5M
Table 1: Characteristics of the active IPv6 WWW client address data sets. Counts determined by our method, as
described in Section 2, are shown bold. The others are simple activity counts during the 7 days of observation.
more than 25% of the prefixes needed prefix lengths
less than 48, i.e., not even two /64s are aggregated by
/48s therein. Moreover, we presume no one would settle
for such a weak notion of anonymity as k = 2, which
would be equivalent to truncating only 1 bit in IPv4,
or aggregating to /31. Both in the past and today with
IPv4, it is common to truncate or aggregate to /24 pre-
fixes, presumably with the intention of aggregating up
to 256 (max) individuals’ addresses together. We con-
sider more reasonable values of k for privacy, next.
3.2 Anonymous Aggregates
We now apply kIP anonymization to addresses for
each of the three ISPs. Figure 4 characterizes the re-
sulting prefixes in histograms for k = 32 and k = 256.
(Essentially, these are equivalent to aggregating a fully-
utilized IPv4 network to /27 or /24, respectively.) At
these levels of anonymization, we find that, the JP ISP
and EU ISP almost always required more aggregation
than /48 (more than 80 bits truncated) for us to guar-
antee that the aggregation meets our desired k on lower
bounds for median counts of simultaneously-assigned
addresses. The kIP anonymous aggregate prefixes re-
ported here vary from /25 to /58. In CDF plots (not
shown) for the US ISP’s customer’s, we find that /48 ag-
gregation guarantees k = 32 anonymization for 90-95%
(min-max) of those customers, but guarantees k = 256
anonymization for only 30-40% of those customers. By
comparing the resulting kIP anonymous aggregate pre-
fixes counts to fixed-length /48 prefix counts, as shown
parenthetically in the legends in Figure 4, by and large,
we see that kIP anonymization (with k = 256 or even
k = 32) can yield a much smaller set of anonymous pre-
fixes while guaranteeing significant aggregation of indi-
viduals’ /64 prefixes.
8 16 24 32 40 48 56 64
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EU ISP min 108K prefixes
EU ISP max 2.81M prefixes
JP ISP min 97.3K prefixes
JP ISP max 1.10M prefixes
US ISP min 304K prefixes
US ISP max 1.17M prefixes
Figure 3: CDF of aggregate prefix lengths, k = 2.
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Figure 4: Anonymous aggregate prefix lengths.
4. LIMITATIONS & FUTURE WORK
In offline operation, e.g., anonymizing addresses of
clients that access a worldwide CDN as we report here,
the guarantee of anonymization is strong because every
address observed is used as input to the anonymiza-
tion. However, in online operation, e.g., anonymizing
addresses on the fly, the guarantee is unclear because
the anonymous aggregate set was determined a priori,
based on addresses active in the past. Thus, online op-
eration of this method entails forecasting, wherein the
anonymizer likely assumes that past activity is suitably
representative.
Lets consider attacks and situations that might call
our claimed privacy guarantee into question. In this
work, we treat an address’ /64 prefix and anything more
specific, e.g., the IID, as private. While it’s common for
ISPs to provide a /64 prefix to a customer, some ISPs
will honor requests for a larger prefix, e.g., a /60 or
/56 [9, 10, 17]. Then, the customer’s router can adver-
tise SLAAC prefix(es) to the their hosts. In this case,
it is possible for an individual customer to have a set
of simultaneously-assigned /64 prefixes, resulting in an
anonymous aggregate where the number of distinct cus-
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tomers could be much less than k. To combat this, an
anonymizer wants to know the customer’s prefix length,
so that it might increase k accordingly. Discovering this
prefix length automatically (via the activity matrix) is
ongoing work. Similarly, if a malicious party generates
traffic from what would be quiescent source addresses
in many unique /64 prefixes, they might cause kIP-
anonymization to report more specific anonymous ag-
gregates allowing them to determine what their neigh-
bors’ nearest active prefixes might be. For this reason,
it may be important to keep time series of simultane-
ously assigned address counts (as we do here), so that
anomalous counts, e.g., during flash crowds, or attacks,
can be identified and/or ignored.
In conclusion, we evaluate IPv6 address anonymization
and demonstrate that truncation to a single prefix length
of 48 bits, Internet-wide, fails to anonymize information
associated with individuals’ IP address identities, e.g.,
/64 prefixes, in the face of some common addressing
practices used today. We develop a technique to com-
pute lower bound counts on simultaneously-assigned ad-
dresses and an improved anonymization method that
truncates to variable prefix lengths guaranteeing a de-
sired degree of address privacy. Our results show that
kIP anonymization, e.g., with k = 32, outperforms IPv6
address anonymization by 80-bit truncation. Thus, we
propose this as preferred privacy practice in research
and operations and invite community feedback.
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